Precommitment Devices
Also known as: commitment devices, commitment contracts, Ulysses pacts
A precommitment device is any arrangement you set up now that restricts your future options or attaches a cost to backing out: a self-imposed deadline, money staked on a goal, a website blocker you cannot easily disable. It works on procrastination because it accepts that in-the-moment willpower is unreliable and moves the decisive choice to a calmer moment, when you are planning rather than tempted.
| Origin | An old idea, Ulysses binding himself to the mast, formalised in behavioural economics by Thomas Schelling's work on self-command in the 1980s and studied empirically from the 2000s |
|---|---|
| Time required | Minutes to set up; the constraint then runs itself |
| Best for | deadline procrastination, digital distraction, chronic backsliding, goals with long payoffs |
| Difficulty | Easy to set up; the design matters more than the effort |
How to use precommitment devices
- Identify the exact failure moment: the point where you reliably cave, not the goal in general.
- Choose a device that binds that moment: a deadline declared to someone who will check, a blocker with a lock mode, money staked through a service or a friend.
- Make the penalty certain and prompt, not large and theoretical. A sure £10 loss beats an unlikely £500 one.
- Space deadlines evenly through a project rather than one big one at the end.
- Tell someone. A witness converts a private intention into a social commitment.
- Review after two weeks: tighten devices you are gaming, drop ones you no longer need.
This is one of the best-documented ideas in behavioural economics. Ariely and Wertenbroch's classroom experiments showed students given evenly spaced binding deadlines outperformed those with one final deadline, and that many students voluntarily chose costly self-imposed deadlines, though they set them less effectively than an external scheduler would. Field studies of commitment savings accounts and health commitment contracts show real behaviour change, and reviews by Bryan, Karlan and Nelson and by Rogers, Milkman and Volpp summarise consistent, if sometimes modest, effects. The honest caveats: people often underuse or underprice commitment, badly designed penalties just get paid, and devices constrain behaviour without changing the underlying preference.
Ariely, D., & Wertenbroch, K. (2002). Procrastination, deadlines, and performance: self-control by precommitment. Psychological Science, 13(3), 219–224.
Bryan, G., Karlan, D., & Nelson, S. (2010). Commitment devices. Annual Review of Economics, 2, 671–698.
Rogers, T., Milkman, K. L., & Volpp, K. G. (2014). Commitment devices: using initiatives to change behavior. JAMA, 311(20), 2065–2066.
Common mistakes
- Setting one giant deadline at the end. Ariely and Wertenbroch's data favour evenly spaced interim deadlines.
- Making the device escapable in ten seconds. A blocker you can toggle off is a suggestion, not a commitment.
- Choosing a penalty you secretly do not mind paying. The stake has to hurt just enough that you would rather do the work.
Related techniques
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Frequently asked questions
What is a commitment device?
A self-imposed arrangement that restricts your future choices or penalises backing out, set up in advance because you know your in-the-moment self will be tempted. Examples: staked money, binding interim deadlines, locked app blockers.
Do commitment devices actually work for procrastination?
Yes, with evidence. Controlled experiments show self-imposed and externally set interim deadlines improve performance, and field trials of commitment contracts show behaviour change. Effects depend heavily on design: certain, prompt penalties and well-spaced deadlines.
What are examples of precommitment for studying or work?
Booking a shared library session, sending a draft-due date to a colleague, a website blocker in lock mode during work hours, staking money on submitting by Friday, or paying for a course with attendance checks.